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Abstract
The global issue of humanitarian intervention has become more pro-
nounced and complicated in recent years due to increasingly diverging
views on addressing security crises between the West on one side and
Russia and China on the other. Despite their support for the principles of
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), both Russia and China are wary of
Western intervention in internal conﬂicts after the Cold War and have
become increasingly critical of Western-led armed intervention in hu-
manitarian conﬂicts. Unease in Beijing and Moscow over the multilateral
intervention in the 2011 Libyan conﬂict and their ongoing opposition to
Western policies in the Syrian Civil War since 2011 would seem to point
to ever more coincidence in their negative views of American and Western
intervention policies. A conventional wisdom has thus emerged that
there is something akin to a Sino–Russian ‘bloc’, with near-identical pol-
icies of discouraging armed intervention within state borders under the
aegis of humanitarian intervention or the R2P doctrine, signed in 2005
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(2005 World Summit). However, closer examination of Russian and
Chinese positions on the Libyan and Syrian conﬂicts, drawing on norma-
tive and identity perspectives, reveals signiﬁcant differences in how both
states address intervention in civil conﬂicts involving human rights emer-
gencies. Indeed, the Libyan and Syrian cases suggest that the distance
between the two states on ‘acceptable’ policies toward international
intervention in civil conﬂicts may actually be increasing. While Russia has
assumed the role of the ‘loud dissenter’ in global dialogs on humanitar-
ian intervention, China has opted for the position of a ‘cautious partner’.
1 Introduction
Discussions about the changing global order, the rise of China, and the appar-
ent shift in global power distribution from West to East (see Bates, 2007;
Kang, 2007; Beckley, 2011/12; Glaser, 2011; Shifrinson and Beckley, 2013)
have become ubiquitous in recent years (see Hurrell, 2006; Onea, 2013; Snyder,
2013). Concerns have also been expressed that China, and other emerging
great powers, will seek to establish new forms of security cooperation in line
with their own normative perspectives (Zhang, 2011), altering—or perhaps
even usurping—the established Western-dominated international system, with
its prevailing norms, institutions, and ‘rules of the game’ (see Lynch, 2007;
Chin and Thakur, 2010; Larson and Shevchenko, 2010; Terhalle, 2011).
A fundamental issue is the way in which the international community
has dealt with major humanitarian and security crises, and in particular
the now-established global norm of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), built
around the doctrine of the same name. A source of controversy prior to its
institutionalization (see Ayoob, 2004; MacFarlane et al., 2004; Bellamy,
2005; Wheeler and Morris, 2006), its utility has again come to the fore-
front of the global security agenda with the recent crises in Africa and the
Middle East, particularly in Libya and Syria, as well as the ‘Islamic State’
(IS) insurgency in Iraq and attacks on minority peoples in that country,
Mali, the Central African Republic and the rise of the extremist group
Boko Haram in eastern Africa. However, this increased attention does not
imply that the international community has now formed a consensus on
the requirements necessary to intervene in a civil conﬂict, within which hu-
manitarian conditions have either deteriorated or have been directly
attacked (Bellamy and Williams, 2011).
Indeed, many non-Western powers such as China and Russia, together
with the other ‘emerging power’ members of the ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, India,
114 Aglaya Snetkov and Marc Lanteigne
and South Africa), voiced their suspicions and disapproval of this initiative
both prior to and following the adoption of the 2005 Convention. Both on
the international political stage and in the academic literature, China and
Russia are frequently perceived as the most critical of the non-Western
powers, due to their privileged position as permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Bellamy, 2009), their history of
direct rivalry to Western strategy and ideology during the Cold War, and
their long histories of being subject to invasion and border conﬂicts.
The signiﬁcance of these two states’ position on humanitarian interven-
tion and R2P is magniﬁed by their holding of UNSC veto power, as the R2P
Convention states all initiatives must be pre-approved by the UN Security
Council. Furthermore, they are often both depicted as actors concerned
with maintaining the primacy of state sovereignty within the international
system, referred to as ‘neo-Westphalianism’ (Lanteigne and Hirono, 2011),
and as acting as a normative partnership in their misgivings regarding the
R2P concept and its application. Indeed, their actions in relation to the
Libyan conﬂict and the Syrian civil war, and the crisis over Ukraine in 2014,
are often cited as evidence of their ‘disruptive’ or ‘spoiler’ policies with
regards to R2P. For example, after China and Russia vetoed a UNSC reso-
lution on potential sanctions on Syria’s Assad government in June 2012,
both states were harshly criticized by American and British ofﬁcials for
appearing to stand in the way of ending the conﬂict (Gladstone, 2012).
Furthermore, there has been much interest in the growing strategic rela-
tionship between China and Russia since the end of the Cold War. Moscow
was the ﬁrst major beneﬁciary of the ‘partnership’ diplomacy China under-
took in the 1990s, and mutual concerns about Western power in Eurasia not
only strengthened bilateral Sino–Russian ties but also contributed to the
founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001 (Cheng
and Wankun, 2004; Lanteigne, 2006/7). The post-2011 American ‘pivot’ or
‘rebalancing’ policy of US strategic interests to the Asia-Paciﬁc, along with
American support for a potential Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership trade agreement
which excludes China and Russia, encouraged closer Sino–Russian cooper-
ation out of concerns about future US intentions in the region (Chan, 2013).
Limited research has been undertaken into the perspectives and positions
of China and Russia with regard to R2P, either individually, jointly, or in a
comparative approach (Allison, 2009; Evans, 2009; Pang, 2009; Petro, 2008/9;
Teitt, 2009; Fullilove, 2011; Tiewa, 2012). Indeed, the decision to focus pri-
marily on China and Russia’s positions on R2P, to the exclusion of the other
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permanent members of the UNSC such as the United States, France or
the UK,1 was a response to existing literature in this area, which frequently
highlights these two powers as the main ‘disrupters’ and opponents of R2P,
particularly within the UNSC. Indeed, Russia and China are often considered
a single bloc or alliance on this issue in opposition to Western powers, at
times of major international crises (Lo, 2008; Brenton, 2013). The worsening
diplomatic relationship in 2014, between Moscow and the West over the
Ukraine crises and the emerging ‘pivot to Asia’ policies of President Putin,
which include increased fossil fuel sales to Beijing and the development of a
special economic zone in the Russian Far East city of Vladivostok, reinforced
this viewpoint (Hill and Lo, 2013; RIANovosti, 16 April 2013).
This work intends to shed more light on these two actors’ position
vis-à-vis R2P, the extent to which China and Russia have been effectively
‘socialized’ into accepting the R2P norm, whether or not they seek to
subvert it and if they are in the process of building an alternative alliance
around the issue. The empirical focus will be on examining Russian and
Chinese responses toward the debates regarding R2P during recent secur-
ity crises in the MENA region, namely the discussions and decisions to op-
erationalize the principle of R2P vis-à-vis the crises in Libya (2011) and
more recently in Syria (2011–). It is argued that while there are many simi-
larities between the Chinese and Russian positions on R2P, there are also
signiﬁcant differences between their approaches to humanitarian interven-
tion. In order to deconstruct the differing facets of China and Russia’s
positions toward humanitarian intervention, this paper adopts a multi-
dimensional perspective – taking into account both their security ‘cultures’
in relation to state sovereignty, security, and intervention and the roles that
they seek to play in international affairs (Katzenstein, 1996; Acharya,
2004; Kirchner and Sperling, 2010; Lantis, 2014; Scobell, 2014), particu-
larly at times of signiﬁcant security and humanitarian crises.
In line with constructivist perspectives in international relations, the
security cultures of Russia and China should not be seen as static frames
1 Indeed, France also forms an interesting case of a ‘sober second thought’ but Western power
that often ﬁnds itself distant from the security positions of the UK and the United States as
in the case of the Iraq invasion 2003. However, due to the limited space available in this
article, the discussion in this article is limited to China and Russia as they are often the ones
that are said to be forming an anti-Western opposition bloc in the UNSC against Western-led
calls for the use of the R2P doctrine. For more information on the position of France
vis-à-vis R2P, see Bellamy andWilliams (2011), Davidson (2013), and Simonen (2012).
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of reference, but as dynamic, ﬂuid, and constantly evolving processes, espe-
cially in light of their shifting power levels (Snetkov, 2012, 2014). While
the question of the role that great powers seek to play in international
affairs is central to the current debate on the changing global order
(Hurrell, 2006; Schweller, 2011; Shambaugh, 2011; Kahler, 2013), most of
the current critique within the literature on humanitarian interventions
stems from a normative perspective.
Many of the disagreements within the UNSC arise not only as a result
of differing perspectives but because of the different roles that actors
undertake or see others undertaking, along with the question of state iden-
tities. This paper argues that Russia is willing to adopt more public and de-
clarative stances on issues such as the Libyan and Syrian conﬂicts, whereas
conversely, China appears to prefer a more conservative, understated ap-
proach in line with international laws and norms, often assuming the iden-
tity of a middle power rather than a great power, preferring multilateral
solutions to humanitarian crises and taking on the persona of a ‘joiner’
within international regimes dedicated to promoting peace and stability.
This is partly due to Beijing’s desire to counter impressions, especially in
the West, of a ‘China threat’ (Zhongguo weixie) as a result of the country’s
rise. In China’s view, as long as Chinese interests are not adversely affected
and a challenge to Chinese values including the sovereignty of the Chinese
state is not perceived in a particular initiative, China is in practice, more
open to engagement and participation. Like Russia, China remains sensi-
tive to Western policies of de facto regime change as part of humanitarian
missions but has been reluctant to assume an independent ‘spoiler’ stance
which could amplify the perception of a ‘China threat’. Thus, any analysis
of the two states’ responses to R2P must therefore also consider the differ-
ent roles China and Russia seek to play in relation to such crises.
2 The ‘Loud Dissenter’: Russia’s security culture,
global role, and the principle of humanitarian
intervention
2.1 Russia’s security culture
In spite of signing the R2P doctrine and adopting a softer interpretation
of the principle of sovereignty, since the end of the Cold War, Russia has
retained a state-centric approach to security. Drawing on its history of
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mass-citizen upheavals, revolutions, civil wars and invasions, and more
recent conﬂicts in Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Crimea/Eastern Ukraine,
a strong state and respect for sovereignty is historically positioned as a
pre-requisite to avoid chaos and violence (‘President of Russia’, 2012).
Tellingly, the key focus of President Vladimir Putin’s policies upon coming
to power in 2000 was the re-building of a strong state within Russia, in
order to address and alleviate the instability and socio-economic chaos at
the end of the 1990s (Snetkov, 2015). Thus, ‘human security’ is viewed
alongside state and societal stability, while the formal institutions and trap-
pings of statehood are prioritized at the expense of wider discussion about
the functioning of state processes. As noted in Moscows 2009 National
Security Concept, ‘the main long-term directions of state policy in the
sphere of state and public security must be the reinforcement of the role of
the state as guarantor of the security of the individual’ (Russian Security
Council, 2009).
The principles of state sovereignty and the fear of external actors be-
coming involved in a sovereign state’s internal affairs continue to play a
central role in Russian security culture, frequently resulting in frictions in
its relations with the West, as Moscow becomes increasingly wary of any
perceived interference in its domestic and regional affairs from state or
non-state actors (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Ongoing fric-
tions have continued over issues such as the Chechen conﬂicts (1994–96;
1999–2009), the Yukos Affair, the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine,
and Kyrgyzstan in 2004–06, the high-proﬁle assassinations of journalist
Anna Politkovskaya in Moscow and former intelligence ofﬁcer Aleksandr
Litvinenko in London, and more recently the 2012 ‘Pussy Riot’ legal case
and the controversial June 2013 law against the dissemination of ‘homo-
sexual propaganda’ (AFP/Telegraph, 2013 30 June 2013). Tensions
between the West and Moscow reached new heights in 2014 with the
Russian annexation of Crimea and the subsequent rebellion in Eastern
Ukraine, widely viewed as being indirectly supported by Moscow. In add-
ition, on the global stage, President Putin has continued to re-iterate his
complaints about international actors which disregard state sovereignty,
declaring that they adopt ‘missile-and-bomb democracy’ (Valdai Club, 27
February 2012). Thus, Russia remains highly critical of any suggestion of
external interference into domestic spaces becoming the norm in inter-
national affairs.
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The preservation of ‘cultural plurality’ within the international system
also remains prominent, gaining an ever greater prominence in Russia’s
foreign security policy agenda (Herszenhorn and Kramer, 2013). The key
point of contestation is not over the form, but rather, the content of these
different international norms. For example, despite repeated declarations
of support for human rights, Russia also maintains that ‘nobody has a
monopoly over what constitutes human rights’ (Valdai Club, 27 February
2012). It is therefore argued that global norms should be implemented in
line with national traditions and local norms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Russia, 15 February 2013).
A clear distinction, however, exists between areas seen as local and
those as distant within Russia’s geopolitical foreign policy script. Events in
what Moscow considers its own neighborhood and those in other regions
of the world continue to be considered very differently. Its post-Soviet
legacy means that Russian authorities continue to see the space of the
former Soviet Union as its area of ‘privileged interest’ (‘President of
Russia’, 31 August 2008). While it might not be intent on reconstituting a
‘Soviet Union 2.0’, Moscow’s view of ‘its’ region or ‘near abroad’ (blizh-
neye zarubezhye) has closely inﬂuenced its internal security thinking since
the presidency of Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, with an emphasis on ‘sover-
eignty, regime stability and noninterference in the internal affairs of these
states’ (Averre, 2009). Accordingly, Moscow follows a much less principled
position toward events and circumstances within this immediate external
space, as demonstrated most recently in Russia’s action vis-à-vis Crimea
and Eastern Ukraine.
By contrast, it is more circumspect in its global policies, acknowledging
that the international system is becoming increasingly multipolar, with dif-
ferent powers and regions gaining increasing inﬂuence (Putin, 2012), with
no single power or bloc able to exert complete control over the internation-
al system (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 13 September 2012). In
turn, the West is seen as a disruptive actor amidst the changing global
order, seeking to recover the loss of its earlier dominance in global eco-
nomic and political spheres (Putin, 2007), a perception that was exacer-
bated by the US-led military operation in Iraq (2003–12). For Russia, such
moves are said to result in increased instability and overt competition in
international affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 13 September
2012).
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However, despite acknowledging the need to democratize the inter-
national system, Russia is also a status quo power, particularly when it
comes to the United Nations, which ensures Russia a privileged position
as a veto power in the UNSC. In this regard, Moscow is highly critical of
what it sees as the West’s ‘attempts to divide States into “bad” and “good”
or “pupils” and “tutors” and to dilute the interstate character of the
Council’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 1 March 2011). An oppon-
ent of any attempts to revise commonly accepted legal norms within the
UN Charter and weaken the power of the UN, and most importantly, the
UN Security Council (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 5 April 2011),
Moscow is a proponent of strengthening the legal basis of international
relations, and the preeminence of international law (‘President of Russia’,
7 May 2012).
2.2 Russia’s role and behavior in international affairs
Raising its proﬁle internationally at the same time as pursuing an inde-
pendent, unique, self-assured, and ‘responsible’ foreign policy remains
central to Russia’s contemporary security culture (President of Russia, 15
February 2013). As a defender of normative pluralism, meaning the exist-
ence and proliferation of norms from different levels and directions within
the international system, Moscow riles against those actors seeking to
impose foreign models of behavior onto other international actors (Putin,
2007). This theme played a considerable role in its discourse on the ‘global
war on terror’ (Snetkov, 2012) and has continued to permeate its discourse
over the prospect for changing global order.
As part of its attempts to increase its role internationally, and as a per-
manent member of the UNSC, it continues to consider itself as a guardian
of international security. It demands that its opinion be sought and its pos-
ition respected at times of crises. As noted by Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov, the UN veto is an important instrument for avoiding the
mistakes of the League of Nations, the precursor to the UN which he sug-
gests ‘collapsed because of ignoring of the interests of the largest states’
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 13 September 2012). In this respect,
Russia views its UN veto as a special privilege that grants it a signiﬁcant
role internationally (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 15 February
2013). Moscow is sensitive to any international security crises where its
voice, via the UNSC, is disregarded, and such snubs tend to lead to Russia
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returning to a much more vocal, obstinate, and obdurate position, as seen
during the Kosovo crisis in 1998–99 (Dobriansky, 2000), the Iraq crisis in
2003 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 21 January 2004), and most re-
cently in the events in Libya (2011) and in Syria (2011–). It thus remains
very sensitive to events or circumstances in which its position as a great
power is challenged or is seen to be undermined by other international
actors, while embracing its role and position as a mediator in international
disputes.2
However, conscious of its diminished international status, the role it
seeks to play in most international security crises is primarily that of an
overseeing authority. Despite seeking to develop its relations with other
regions, as demonstrated by its policy toward the SCO and the BRICS, the
G8 and the G20 (Latukhina, 2013), the regime in Moscow acknowledges
that it has neither the capacity nor the interest in becoming actively
engaged in all international crises and thus continues to stress the import-
ance of abiding by international law when resolving international disputes
and crises (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 1 March 2011). Indeed,
even in the case of the Ukraine crisis and the Russian annexation of
Crimea, the Putin regime has sought to base its positions on what it sees as
the principle of international law and the illegality of the existing regime in
Kiev, thus seeking to justify—despite extensive criticism from the inter-
national community—its actions in this particular crisis according to this
logic (Moiseienko 2014).
2.3 Russia’s position toward the R2P norm and the principle of
humanitarian interventions
Even at its signing in 2005, Russiawas expressing its reservations about the
Convention of R2P potentially weakening the principle of state sovereign-
ty in international affairs. It, therefore, remains a fervent supporter of the
UNSC Charter, which enshrines the principle of sovereignty, international
law, and noninterference in the internal affairs of states. For Russia, as a
power that proclaims its support for the maintenance of international law,
2 Both as a result of historical circumstances and due to its ongoing interest in preserving its
international role, Russia is currently involved in many of international mediation forums,
such as the Six Nations talks on Iran, the suspended Six-Party Talks (SPT) on North Korea,
and the Middle East Quartet.
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humanitarian intervention should only ever be sanctioned through the
UNSC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 13 September 2012).
The signiﬁcance of R2P, for Russia, is primarily as an institutionalized
principle within the UN, rather than as representing a widespread change
in valuation of state sovereignty within the international system. As Russia
does not usually initiate nor veto such proposals, it sees itself as a respon-
sible international power that uses its veto wisely and sparingly (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 13 September 2012) and as such, during most
major humanitarian crises, its role is primarily that of a disinterested
partner that does not seek to be involved, rather than as a disruptive force.
Despite its stated goal of increasing its involvement in UN peacekeeping
operations, Russia does not tend to deploy its troops on the ground in
remote locations as demonstrated in the case of Darfur in Sudan, Côte
d0Ivoire or the post-Arab Spring events in the Middle East (‘President of
Russia, 2011’, 21 March 2011). Indeed, as of July 2014, Russia had
deployed 107 personnel to peacekeeping missions from a total of over
ninety-six thousand. China, at the same time, had 2196 personnel serving
in UN peace operations (United Nations, 2014 31 July 2014).
From the Russian perspective, frictions regarding R2P arise largely as a
result of the way it is applied in practice, particularly by the West, rather
than from the principle itself. Events such as Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq,
Libya, and Syria have, for Russia, become precedents by which Western
powers have ‘instrumentalized’ the principle of humanitarian intervention
to further their own agendas internationally (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Russia, 23 May 2012). This was the particular argument made during the
Libya crisis,3 and most recently in the case of Syria, when Russia’s ﬁrst
UNSC veto was presented as a responsible response (Baklanov, 2011) to
prevent the ‘irresponsible’ West from misusing this norm to further their
own ends (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 13 September 2012), a
concern shared by China.
In line with its strategic culture, Russia remains deeply suspicious of any
proposal that appears to encourage regime change (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Russia, 13 February 2012; 15 February 2013). However, its cri-
tique of forced regime changes in the international sphere stems not only
3 The Russian authorities regarded the West’s actions in Libya as going beyond the narrow
mandate set out in the UNSC Resolution 1973 over the establishment of the no-ﬂy zone over
Libya. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 5 April 2011.
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from its attempts to preserve state sovereignty as the guiding principle of
international affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 3 March 2012)
but also from its fear of ‘statelessness’ as a product of Russia’s own long
history of civil conﬂict (S. Lavrov, 15 June 2012).
Instead of the use of force, Russia advocates diplomacy as the best route
for resolving such civil crises (Russia Today, 11 February 2013), as in the
case of the conﬂicts in Darfur (Sudan), Myanmar (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Russia, 13 January 2007; 23 May 2009), Côte d0Ivoire (Anishchuk,
2011), Libya, and most recently in Syria. In the latter case, Russia main-
tained its position that the Syrians should decide on their own future at the
negotiation table with all the parties included. The Putin government publi-
cally declared their lack of concern about the survival or future of the Assad
regime, acknowledging that change was needed, but refused to support any
proposal advocating regime change by outside forces (President of Russia,
2012, 20 December 2012). Unlike in the case of China, Moscow’s strategic
interests in Syria go beyond the issue of precedent, as the Russian Naval
facility at Tartus, north of Damascus, is a key port for Russian vessels in the
Mediterranean and the last remaining Russian military installation outside
of the former USSR, as well as a staging point for future strategic relations
with nearby Cyprus (DeutscheWelle, 29 June 2013).
Russia supported the Geneva Communiqué in July 2012, setting out
the principle of a transitional authority in Syria, primarily because it did
not call for outright regime change. In contrast, Russia vetoed a July 2012
UNSC resolution against Syria and criticized the West for being too hasty
in advocating policies which would amount to regime change (Lavrov,
2012), and in the process undermine international law and the 2005
Convention on the Responsibility to Protect. In a December 2013 editorial
in Pravda, Russian support for UN actions in Libya was viewed as a
‘mistake’ which brought about regime change but also unleashed factional
ﬁghting which continued to plague the country long after the fall of the
Gaddaﬁ government (Lulka, 2013).
In an attempt to raise its international proﬁle, Russia has been willing
to act as a mediator and engage in shuttle diplomacy between warring
parties, as in the case of Libya, and most recently, Syria. While Katz sug-
gested that Russia’s current policy in Syria undermined its previous efforts
to boost its role in the Middle East (Katz, 2012), the Putin regime main-
tains it has acted responsibly by assuming this mediator role. Indeed,
Russia’s willingness to position itself both as a ‘loud dissenter’ and a
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mediator between the warring parties was most aptly illustrated when it
proposed in September 2013 to bring Syria’s chemical weapons under
international oversight, following a chemical attack by the Assad regime
in the suburbs of Damascus in August (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Russia, 28 September 2013). Furthermore, in a controversial September
2013 opinion piece in theNew York Times, Putin denigrated the ‘common-
place’ policy in the United States of supporting armed intervention in civil
conﬂicts, noting that in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, security
was not achieved (Putin, 2013).
Despite adopting this very public role as a mediator for the regime,
Moscow also emphasized that most mediation efforts should be under-
taken either by the UN or regional actors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Russia, 28 September 2013). In Syria, Russia backed the Arab League ini-
tiative which was better aligned with its version of how such humanitarian
crises should be resolved. In this respect, Russia appeared to have come to
accept the importance of the role that regional actors can and should play
in such crises as enshrined within the 2005 R2P Convention. However, fric-
tions remain as much over who decides which regional actors have the le-
gitimacy to speak for the region, as about the principle of R2P itself.
Moreover, Russia has begun to utilize the principle of R2P to justify its
own foreign policy actions closer to home. This was most telling during
the brief 2008 Russia–Georgia war, during which Russia suggested that its
intervention in Georgia was to prevent mass killings in the disputed region
of South Ossetia (Coppieters, 2012). This version of events was loudly cri-
ticized both by Georgia and the international community (Evans, 2009),
with even the EU-led Independent Fact Finding Mission on the Conﬂict
in Georgia criticizing Russia’s use of the terms of humanitarian interven-
tion to justify its actions (EU, 2009). Similarly, in the case of Russia’s pos-
ition toward the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and its annexation of Crimea – the
Putin regime argued that the authorities in Kiev were preparing to commit
mass atrocities against the Russian-speaking populations in South-eastern
regions. In turn, the Russian authorities moved to call on the principle of
R2P, which, at least in part, served to justify their actions in supporting/
propping up those particular military factions. In addition, both these
crises demonstrated, at least for the Russian side, that the West no longer
has the sole prerogative to use or, as in the case of Russia in Georgia or
Ukraine, abuse the principle of R2P in order to justify its role and behavior
124 Aglaya Snetkov and Marc Lanteigne
in its foreign policy (for more on this debate, see Allison, 2008; Evans,
2009).
At this stage, and despite the 2008 Georgia war and the 2014 crisis in
Ukraine, Russia remains reluctant to incorporate this norm within its own
region. Indeed, despite making some use of this norm within its regional
policy, it does so alongside other principles and justiﬁcations for its
actions, such as historical precedents as in the case of Crimea or self-
defense as in the case of Georgia in protecting its peacekeepers, rather
than solely justifying its actions on the principle of R2P, as was for
example the case in the West’s attempts to use the norm of R2P in the case
of Libya. However, this may change in the future. Russia is currently
seeking to increase regional mechanisms and instruments within its own
regional sphere giving it the capacity for future intervention in regional se-
curity crises, as demonstrated by Russian support for both the SCO and
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, although both of these region-
al instruments are built around the core principle of maintaining sover-
eignty and noninterference in domestic affairs (President of Russia, 19
December 2012). Nonetheless, Russia remains reluctant to make R2P a
decisive principle in its foreign policy, particularly when it comes to inter-
national, rather than regional, security crises.
3 The ‘Cautious Partner’: China’s security culture,
global role, and the principle of humanitarian
intervention
3.1 China’s security culture
Although China’s security thinking and emerging grand strategy has long
been the subject of much internal debate, most notably after the death of
Mao Zedong in 1976, the current period of security policy restructuring
under the administration of Xi Jinping (2012–) has presented new chal-
lenges both domestically and internationally. Much of this evolving policy
thinking has stemmed from Beijing’s views that conﬂict in the internation-
al system was being deﬁned less by state-to-state conﬂict and more by civil
wars and nontraditional security issues, including the threat of internation-
al terrorism. As well, since the 1990s, Beijing has participated more fre-
quently in international regimes and ‘norm-making’ in proportion to its
growing political, economic, and strategic power. Yet, there remains a level
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of sensitivity in Chinese foreign policy toward ‘great power chauvinism’
from the West, coupled with unease in the face of having to assume both
the responsibilities and the rights inherent in great power status, resulting
in the persistence of ‘stage fright’ (qiechang) in some of China’s inter-
national relations, particularly in regions outside of East Asia (Lanteigne,
2013a,b).
Since the 1990s, Beijing has sought to counter perceived Western stra-
tegic trends toward more activist intervention in civil conﬂicts by reinfor-
cing its traditional ideas of state sovereignty, modifying these views by
adapting a policy which argued that intervention needed to be carried out
in the ‘right’ fashion, via multilateral regimes such as the UN and not via
great powers (read: the United States). This was a considerable shift from
the Maoist era in the 1950s–60s, when Beijing advanced a strategic doc-
trine which stood against great power ‘imperialism’ and stressed the need
for developing states, especially those in Asia, to respect each other’s terri-
torial integrity, avoid interference in other states’ sovereign affairs, and
solve disputes through dialog rather than force (Odgaard, 2012). These
ideas were given new life immediately after the cold war due to concerns
about American ‘hyper-power’ and unilateral activism within local and
civil conﬂicts, including the 1991 Iraq–Kuwait war (although Beijing
opted to abstain during that particular UNSC vote rather than veto), and
subsequently in UN interventions in Bosnia–Herzegovina, Haiti, Rwanda,
and Somalia. Beijing was even less pleased with the unilateral American
military actions undertaken outside of the egis of the United Nations, the
primary example being the 1999 Kosovo conﬂict (Chen, 2003).
The most concrete example of these new policy shifts had been Beijing’s
evolving post-cold war policy of a ‘New Security Concept’ (xin anquan
guandian), an idea which despite its vagueness, assumed increasing levels
of importance in Chinese foreign and strategic policies ﬁrst developed
under President Jiang Zemin in the 1990s. The NSC offered a far more
multifaceted approach to security and cooperation, as evidenced by
Beijing’s attempts to develop bilateral strategic ‘partnerships’, as well as
interacting more positively with multilateral institutions, especially on the
regional, Asia-Paciﬁc level. As well, the NSC had been designed as a
primary tool for Beijing to downplay any perceived coercive or revisionist
nature of its rising power in Asia and beyond, while emphasizing the coun-
try’s increasing importance as a strategic partner rather than emerging ad-
versary (Lampton, 2005).
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The NSC was heavily inﬂuenced by Maoist era ‘Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence’ and stressed equality and noninterference (Sha,
2000). The Principles had their origins in regional talks between China,
Myanmar (Burma), and India in the 1950s as means were sought to
promote peaceful interaction between states with different social systems
in ways which discouraged alliance or bloc mindsets. Then-Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai was credited with their integration into Chinese
foreign policy doctrine in 1954. The Five Principles, mutual respect for
sovereignty and territory, non-aggression, noninterference in internal
affairs, equality and mutual beneﬁt, and peaceful co-existence, were also
praised in China for their ﬂexibility and resiliency, since they were adapt-
able to both cold war and post-cold war strategic interactions (Scobell,
2003; Cheng andWankun, 2004: 185).
However, what distinguished the NSC was that unlike previous strategic
ideologies, which aligned China against perceived enemy forces, especially
imperialism and later hegemonism, the NSC did not identify a third party
as an adversary, but rather nodded to the Deng Xiaoping-era idea of ‘do
not seek an enemy’ (bu xunzhao di) (Liu, 2004), and avoid becoming
entangled in great power security concerns. During the 1991 Gulf War,
China reacted to American views of a ‘new world order’ (shijie zhixu) with
some distrust, interpreting this idea as Washington’s attempt to consoli-
date a hegemonic position on the international level in the wake of the
Soviet Union’s fall. Beijing policymakers instead referred to the more
statist idea of an ‘international order’ (guoji zhixu), which was multipolar
and respected state sovereignty. There were hopes that the post-cold war
international system would become increasingly multipolar (Ren, 2010),
with the United States, Russia, China, Europe, and possibly India becom-
ing main great powers.
China also advocated increasing political, economic, and technological
cooperation as a further means of strengthening ties between states, rather
than using only military power as a basis for linkages (Miller and Liu, 2011).
Since the 1990s, Beijing argued that the alliance-based forms of cooperation
were being inappropriately carried over into the post-cold war international
system, as in the case of NATO. The 1999 NATO operations in Kosovo did
much to fan both nationalism and anti-Americanism in China due to per-
ceived disdain in Washington toward international norms and the accidental
destruction of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO airstrikes in May
of that year (Gries, 2004). The development of the R2P principles in the late
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1990s was also not well-received by policymakers in Beijing, who initially
feared that such ideas amounted to a codiﬁcation of great power rights to
intervene under the guise of humanitarian intervention.
Alternatives to the formalized alliance system were suggested within
China’s 2000 and 2002 National Defense White Papers, which stressed
that security cooperation should be based on mutual respect and consen-
sus rather than great power confrontation (China’s National Defence in
2000: 48). A revised 2008 Defense White Paper focused on the fact that
China’s overall security situation was improving and that various forms of
strategic cooperation were bearing fruit. However, the paper added that
the primary concerns of separatist forces both in Taiwan and Tibet, as well
as the fact that global terrorism and economic insecurity problems, were
still prevalent. These matters were echoed in China’s 2010 Defense White
Paper, which was only released in March 2011. The unrest which took
place in Tibet in 2008 and Xinjiang a year later bolstered Chinese concerns
about separatism and potential tacit intervention by foreign actors
(China’s National Defence in 2008, 2010).
The NSC, and China’s overall evolving approach to humanitarian inter-
vention, could therefore be considered as a means for Beijing to create
greater linkages between maintaining a stable periphery and ensuring
greater security on the international level. While the concept did not stand
against R2P per se, it did seek to prevent perceived abuses of humanitarian
intervention norms. This idea was very much in keeping with cooperative
security theory and was a result of China’s growing conﬁdence in its diplo-
matic skills, as evidenced by what was termed China’s ‘new ﬂexibility and
sophistication’ in its approaches to bilateralism, multilateralism, and secur-
ity relations (Medeiros and Fravel, 2003). These issues became more
evident as China accelerated its strategic activities in East Asia after 2009,
including the modernization of its military and the further pressing of its
maritime claims to the East and South China Seas despite regional oppos-
ition from Japan and Southeast Asia and growing unease in the United
States (Scott, 2012; Hobart, 2013).
However, the Chinese policies of the NSC and the broader and more
nebulous ‘peaceful rise’ (heping jueqi) concept, or the less politically sensi-
tive ‘peaceful development’ (heping fazhan) doctrine under then-President
Hu Jintao (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007), are increasingly giving way to a
heightened pragmatism under Xi as China’s international power develops.
China is now beginning to distinguish between acceptable and
128 Aglaya Snetkov and Marc Lanteigne
unacceptable forms of intervention, and therefore, Beijing’s policy is dem-
onstrating greater ﬂexibility than the Russian model and encompassing a
more internationalist viewpoint. Indeed, Beijing now has the conﬁdence to
accept and sometimes even participate in international peacebuilding
operations, even in civil conﬂicts, and is also able to link disparate forms
of security together as it formulates its own distinct views of how humani-
tarian operations should be implemented.
3.2 China’s role and behavior in international affairs
Despite its remarkable rise in power on several fronts, including political,
economic, and strategic (Barnett and Duvall, 2005), it is unlikely China’s
strategic behavior will be changing toward overt ‘empire-building’
or attempts to challenge Western-dominated organizations and norms,
primarily because much of the international system has served Beijing well
as it emerged from the isolation of the late-Maoist period and began to
engage the international system on several fronts in the 1980s. Nonetheless,
despite China’s ascension to great power status by 2000, there remains a sen-
sitivity in Chinese policy circles toward ‘peaceful evolution’ (heping jinhua),
namely the erosion of the communist government in China not through
direct force, but rather through tacit political, economic, and cultural means
(Ong, 2007). The ex-USSR color revolutions and the subsequent Arab
Spring protests only increased these sensitivities.
Beijing also remains determined to avoid any recurrence of diplomatic
seclusion, which it experienced during the height of the Cold War, resulting
in a mindset of being ‘isolated and surrounded’ (Kennedy, 1988). As China
settles into great power status, it has demonstrated unusual sensitivity
toward its international image. Institutional engagement and a more com-
prehensive and ﬂexible approach to security have addressed these concerns
and have created stronger ties between Chinese policy and international
security issues. Despite much talk in Western governments since the 1990s
about ‘embedding’ Beijing within various international networks in order to
prevent the country from developing into a giant revisionist power, the
current embedding process is having an opposite effect. As China develops
a more distinct strategic policy through institutional engagement, what
sovereignty Beijing might be losing through institutional cooperation is
being increasingly offset by the fact that international security is being
increasingly tied to Chinese strategic interests. In short, as China rises, its
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security interests are frequently attracting greater international scrutiny.
Arguably until the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the same could not be said for
Russia.
Beijing’s primary strategic concerns on the regional level have been that
of ‘containment’ policies, or ‘strategic encirclement’ (zhanlue baowei), by
the United States and its allies (Garver and Wang, 2010). Like Russia,
China is a country with several land and sea neighbors and a history of
border conﬂicts. Beijing had noted, using the USSR as an example, aggres-
sive foreign policies can often trigger a counter-balancing coalition, as evi-
denced by the onset of the Western containment policies against the Soviet
Union in the twentieth century. Beijing could ill-afford such a scenario
during a time of delicate domestic reforms. Under Hu, and continuing
under President Xi, with China’s strategic and economic interests spread
out over a much wider area beyond Asia, concerns about ‘containment’
are not limited to the standard deﬁnition of having one’s own territory
ringed by adversarial actors. Rather, Beijing is also increasingly wary of
having its overseas commitments challenged by the West under the guise
of human rights promotion and interference in civil conﬂicts, especially in
resource-rich areas such as Africa and Central Asia. Thus, compared with
Russia, concerns about ‘economic containment’ weigh much more in
China’s opinions about humanitarian intervention, especially since the
Chinese economy is growing at a much stronger pace than Russia’s, a situ-
ation likely to continue given Western sanctions on Moscow in 2014, fol-
lowing the deepening Ukraine crises.
There is also the realization in Beijing that many of its security issues
have become increasingly intertwined, and thus far too complex to address
unilaterally. Community-building and the growing number of bilateral and
multilateral ties in the region have become increasingly important for China
to ensure the safety of its interests both within and outside of its borders.
However, these initiatives will need to be supplemented with a more robust
policy toward humanitarian intervention, better reﬂecting China as a great
power with interests rapidly spreading far beyond the Paciﬁc Rim.
3.3 China’s position toward the R2P norm and the principle
of humanitarian interventions
As a result of its increasing global role, the prospect of a more independent
Chinese stance on humanitarian intervention has slowly begun to gain
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currency. In this case, Beijing is being increasingly viewed in the West as
stepping onto center stage and obtaining enough power to not only
become a dominant actor in the international system, but also to set the
rules for the creation and maintenance of international norms.
Nonetheless, Chinese views on intervention in the name of human rights
remain subject to internal debates, especially as the government of Xi
Jinping began to construct its foreign policy platforms after 2013.
In comparison with Moscow, Beijing’s stance on intervention has
shifted, becoming more nuanced since the end of the 1990s (Ding, 1990),
as evidenced by China’s increasingly positive response to United Nations’
operations, including in East Timor (now Timor-Leste) in 1999 (Gill and
Reilly, 2000; Lanteigne, 2012), and greater enthusiasm for and participa-
tion in other UN peacekeeping initiatives elsewhere. Beijing has repeatedly
indicated that certain conditions are required, such as speciﬁc UN
Security Council approval, for ‘proper’ intervention to take place. Thus,
at the beginning of the Iraq conﬂict, Beijing did not openly oppose US
actions but was dismayed at both the lack of participation of the UN and
the nature of the American-led ‘coalition of the willing’, which served to
further bypass, in China’s view, the primacy of international law when
addressing global threats (Green, 2008). In response to the 2005 World
Summit on R2P, Beijing’s responses were largely positive, and in a govern-
ment position paper on the subject, the Chinese government guardedly
noted that each state held the responsibility for the safety of its citizens
and that ‘reckless intervention’ should be discouraged. When international
intervention was required, the paper added, its conduct should be under-
taken with ‘prudence’ and within UN guidelines (Teitt, 2008; Foreign
Ministry, China, 7 June 2005).
Furthermore, since 2008, China made further adjustments in its R2P
policies as the country became more widely accepted as a great power both
on a regional level and increasingly on a global level. More recent exam-
ples of intervention on humanitarian grounds have prompted further re-
consideration of whether the country should or should not support such
operations, starting with the Russian military operations against Georgia
over South Ossetia that year. Beijing declined a request from Russia to sign
a communiqué supportive of the operation. China’s unhappiness at the
conﬂict erupting during the long-planned Beijing Olympics produced a
measured rebuke from the Chinese government stating that the spirit of the
‘Olympic truce’ had been broken. China refused to support a precedent
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which would negatively affect its own national interests. It was felt that
Beijing could not decry ‘splittist’ (fenlie zhuyi) or secessionist forces
seeking to promote illegal secessionist movements (such as in the case of
Taiwan or Tibet), while at the same time condoning Russia’s actions
against Georgia (Swanström, 2008; Turner, 2009).
Beijing found itself in a similar situation as a result of the 2014 Crimea
crisis, trying to juggle its antipathy toward unilateral great power interven-
tion with the desire to maintain strong links with Moscow. This has
resulted in considerable diplomatic contortions on Beijing’s part. For
example, when asked about whether the Crimea invasion could be consid-
ered intervention in the affairs of another sovereign state, the response
from a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman was that Beijing upheld its
views on nonintervention but that ‘we take into account the historical facts
and realistic complexity of the Ukrainian issue’ (China Foreign Ministry,
2014; Ding, 2014).
Post-cold war civil conﬂicts, and international responses to them, also
demonstrated the asymmetrical nature of the Sino–Russian relationship,
as well as their sometimes-differing views on how intervention and R2P
should be interpreted. As one study noted, China can ill-afford to allow its
relations with Moscow to adversely affect its lucrative Western linkages,
and at the same time, ‘China as a partner confers a degree of respectability
on Russian foreign policy, whereas the reverse is not the case’ (Lo, 2008).
The question of what China’s direct strategic interests were in the Russia–
Georgia conﬂict is also relevant, since as one editorial noted shortly after
the conﬂict, Beijing did not have a very strong stake in the war given that
the nature of the conﬂict was a geopolitical dispute between Russia
and the West rather than a larger ideological struggle, despite Chinese mis-
givings about Western strategic advances in Eurasia as a result of the color
revolutions (Hsin Pao, 2008, 31 August).
The Arab Spring protests across the Middle East and North Africa also
created a challenge for the Chinese government. As with the color revolu-
tions in the former Soviet Union, the Hu government was anxious to avoid
a ‘demonstration effect’ of sympathetic protests in China (Kennedy, 2012).
While the changes in government in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen took
place largely without external inﬂuence, the situation was far different for
Libya when the Gaddaﬁ regime sought to militarily push back against the
protests, which by 2011 had turned into full-scale rebellion. Similarly to
Russia, China abstained rather than veto the UNSC Resolution 1973 in
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March 2011, allowing it to pass even though a Chinese spokesperson after-
word noted that his government ‘had serious difﬁculty with parts of the
resolution’ largely due to concerns about precedent (Bellamy, 2011).
Beijing was supportive of the international sanctions placed on the
Gaddaﬁ regime during the previous month, which underscored Chinese
opposition to the escalating violence.
During early 2011, Beijing also took the extraordinary step of diverting
one of its naval vessels, the frigate Xuzhou, which had been serving with
the multinational counter-piracy coalition off the coast of Somalia, to
provide cover for the evacuation of over 35,000 Chinese nationals living
and working in Libya (Yan, 2011; Lanteigne, 2013a,b). This was a clear
break from previous resistance from China within the UNSC to interfer-
ence in what Beijing viewed as strictly internal affairs, as evidenced by
China’s controversial January 2007 use of the veto against a Security
Council resolution, which would have punished the military junta in
Myanmar for systematic human rights abuses. Russia had vetoed that reso-
lution as well, marking the ﬁrst use of the Sino–Russian ‘double veto’
(shuangchong foujue) since 1972, with Moscow siding with China in the
view that the Security Council was not the best forum for addressing in-
ternal human rights issues (China Daily, 13 January 2007).
Shortly after the Gaddaﬁ regime was toppled, Beijing found itself at
odds with the successor National Transitional Council in Tripoli over
Beijing’s longstanding support for the previous regime, and China was
also sensitive to attempts by the West to limit new Chinese ﬁnancial initia-
tives in postwar Libya (Dow Jones, 21 October 2011; Xinhua/BBC
Monitoring, 9 September 2011). Beijing paid a heavy price for its de facto
abandonment of the Gaddaﬁ government, as it was suggested that Beijing
lost approximately US$20 billion in bilateral economic deals with Tripoli
after the regime collapsed (Yun, 2013). As well, China remained vexed
with what it perceived was the use of UNSC to essentially force regime
change in Libya by proxy. There was the impression in Beijing that China
had been maneuvered into tacitly supporting Libyan regime change under
the guise of halting hostilities.
Beijing’s irritation with the Libya issue would resurface when the
United Nations sought to address the worsening security situation in
Syria, when protests against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad descended
into full civil war between regime loyalists and various rebel forces during
2012. Like Russia, the Chinese government saw history about to repeat
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itself and China, alongside Russia, used its veto four times since 2011 to
block resolutions calling for punitive measures against the Assad govern-
ment for violence against the Syrian people.
Outgoing Chinese Foreign Minister Yang, 2012 stressed in July 2012
that the best solution to the Syrian crisis was peaceful dialog and opposed
the imposition of a political solution from outside actors. His successor,
Wang Yi, followed the same path by condemning the presence of chemical
weapons in Syria, noting that China had been the victim of such weapons
during the Second World War and supporting the immediate destruction
of such arms, but also calling for nonmilitary solutions (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, China, 1 July 2012; Ministry of Foreign Affairs China, 15
September 2013, 28 September 2013). The insistence by both governments
that diplomacy was the best solution to the crisis at the same time as the
Assad regime was openly suppressing dissent through violence rankled
Western policymakers who were under increasing pressure to directly
intervene.
The third double-veto on action in Syria, in July 2012, brought condem-
nation from Washington and London and halted the possibility of the UN
imposing direct sanctions on the Assad regime (Goldstone, 2012).
Similarly to Moscow, Beijing viewed the resolution as ‘problematic’ and
one-sided in favor of the splintering rebel forces. In explaining its decision,
there was the stressing that China’s objections were procedural rather than
political, namely that the resolution opened the door to excessive outside
interference in the conﬂict, and were not based on any direct interests
Beijing had in the outcome of the dispute (Xinhua, 19 July 2012). A fourth
double-veto was issued in May 2014, when a US-backed, France-drafted
proposition was introduced to refer Syria to the International Criminal
Court, which China and Russia do not recognize (ironically, neither does
the United States). China’s primary concern was that such actions would
hamper international attempts to broker a cease-ﬁre (Sengupta, 2014;
People’s Daily, 22 May 2014).
As the violence continued, however, China attempted to walk more of a
middle diplomatic road in keeping with the country’s growing Middle East
interests and sensitivity to being labeled obstructionist. Beijing maintained
that any solution to the Syrian conﬂict had to come from within the
country but also advocated a cease-ﬁre and called upon the Syrian govern-
ment to accept peace talks and a negotiated leadership transition. Beijing
was also scornful of American threats, later retracted, to use military
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strikes on Syria in the wake of a chemical weapons attack outside of
Damascus in August 2013. Chinawas supportive of the Russian-led initia-
tive to have international observers locate and destroy chemical weapons
supplies. At a September 2013 SCO summit in Bishkek, President Xi
applauded the deal and reiterated his call for a cease-ﬁre (Pennington,
2013; Kyrgyz Television 1/BBC Monitoring, 14 December 2013). Akin to
Russia, Beijing also sought to turn the Syria situation to its beneﬁt,
however, by painting its policies as conservative and constructive in con-
trast to the erratic and activist stances taken by the West. In the days before
an international conference on the Syrian conﬂict was held in Geneva in
January 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi introduced a broad ﬁve-
point plan for addressing the conﬂict, namely that the solution must be
political, that a settlement must be determined by the Syrian people, that
the peace process must be inclusive, that the successor government must
achieve ‘national reconciliation and unity’, and that the international com-
munity must provide humanitarian aid to the country (Xinhua/People’s
Daily, 20 January 2014). However, unless diplomacy in any form contri-
butes to an end to the violence in Syria, a process further complicated by
the 2014 rise of the Islamic State insurgency in next-door Iraq, it will
become more difﬁcult for Beijing to shake off the impression that it is a
spoiler, not a helper, in that conﬂict.
Despite impressions that China and Russia have similar goals in de-
nouncing the possibility of Western-led military intervention in Syria,
China’s concerns were more abstract as compared with Moscow’s worries
about losing a key ally (and strategic military installation), in the Middle
East. Unlike in other parts of the Middle East, China has few economic
assets in Syria, and Beijing has only made baby steps into the labyrinthine
process of Middle East peace negotiations, partially out of concern about
losing what one commentator referred to as its ‘tabula rasa’ status of being
nonaligned in that region (Tiezzi, 2014). After supporting UN resolutions
against Libya when the country fell into civil war, Beijing was nonetheless
dismayed when NATO began operations which directly contributed to the
fall of the Gaddaﬁ regime in August 2011 (Calabrese, 2013: 10–13) Thus,
Beijing was wary of making the same mistakes with Syria and beneﬁtted
from having similar views as Russia, preventing Beijing from being the
only Security Council dissenter and possibly causing greater damage to its
delicate regional relations with the Middle East.
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4 Conclusion: the illusory partnership
Both China and Russia remain powers committed to the principle of sov-
ereignty and a state-centric view on security, yet they have to a certain
degree accepted the notion of R2P in international affairs. Most of the
current frictions on this issue within the UNSC are based on the content,
rather than the form of R2P, and the different roles that international
actors play in such crises. In particular, tensions persist over who plays the
role of the ‘adjudicator’ in such crises. In other words, who, how, when,
which strand, and with whose consent is the R2P norm put into practice.
In this respect, both China and Russia are very keen to preserve their role
as ‘permission givers’ and even ‘norm makers’.
Rather than intending to be obstructionist, both China and Russia have
branded themselves as acting as responsible, ‘sober second thought’
powers in addressing humanitarian crises, ensuring that the current inter-
national rules are upheld. Conversely, they portray the West as an impul-
sive disruptive global force which has often left countries subject to
intervention in a worse security position than before (Afghanistan, Iraq,
and Libya). Reluctant to directly intervene on the ground during these
types of civil conﬂicts, at least in a unilateral fashion, both favor mediation
and diplomacy as primary crisis resolution mechanisms. Moscow, at least
until the Crimea/Ukraine crises, did not demonstrate a willingness to act
singly during civil conﬂicts. As for China, despite its growing power and its
focus on developing into a ‘responsible great power’, Beijing retains a
degree of wariness about being seen as assuming too much global respon-
sibility too soon and instead has often addressed humanitarian crises in
multilateral formats. Thus, within the UN, both countries have found each
other useful to lean on during difﬁcult Security Council votes. That is,
however, a far cry from a looming ‘partnership of spoilers’. As one analyst
noted, ‘Moscow touts its partnership with Beijing mostly to prove to the
rest of the world that Russia still matters, while Chinaviews it as a low-cost
way of placating Russia’ (Mankoff, 2013). This difference is very visible in
the area of humanitarian intervention policy.
Despite certain similarities between their perspectives on R2P, the
notion that China and Russia form a common bloc obscures as much as it
reveals. Key differences within their policies toward intervention remain,
and if anything are becoming increasingly magniﬁed. While Moscow has
been satisﬁed to play the role of a loud and visible dissenter on the
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international stage in addressing of civil conﬂicts, Beijing prefers to follow
a course of quiet diplomacy and is more sensitive to being labeled a
spoiler. In the case of Syria, both have demonstrated their willingness to
use each other as diplomatic cover to demonstrate a united front, while
stressing the need for diplomatic solutions to that crisis despite the worsen-
ing security situation (Yang, 2012). The synergy between the two states
can better be described as a marriage of convenience, which does not ne-
cessarily set a precedent.
Russia is seeking to boost its international role from a position of weak-
ness, at the same time as China’s global presence is growing exponentially,
with its interests increasingly intertwined with regions further aﬁeld.
Nonetheless, China continues to foster an international identity as a ‘reli-
able partner’ with many developing regions, including the Middle East,
while Russian actions continue to project a much more zero-sum approach
amid its ongoing concerns about ‘losing ground’ in key regions to the
West. Since the end of the Cold War, the roles of China and Russia in inter-
national affairs have subtly reversed, with Beijing set to play a much more
active role in future crises, because it now has much deeper ties with
various regions across the globe. At present, China is developing more
concrete strategic policies for regions further aﬁeld from the Asia-Paciﬁc,
as its so-far equivocal policies in Ukraine have demonstrated, but this hesi-
tancy has begun to fade in proportion with overall Chinese power. Thus,
China’s involvement in humanitarian intervention and R2P may in fact in-
crease in the future as its global interests, particularly in the economic
sphere, develop in conjunction with its deepening engagements in regions
further aﬁeld. Should that occur, the supposed Sino–Russian convergence
on intervention would likely become, at best, transitory.
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